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LAB OURING OUTSIDE
THE CHARTER
By DAVID M. BEA=r*

In this essay, Professor Beatty reviews the leading Charter cases decided
by the Supreme Court of Canada which consider the constitutionality of
a variety of different labour laws. In reasoning and result, he finds that
by and large these cases provide strong support for those legal scholars
who are generally sceptical of the law and critical of the courts and who
predicted that, even with the Charter, it was unlikely the Court would
change the antipathy judges have historically displayed to the interests of
workers and their associations. However, while these legal theorists may
draw some comfort from these decisions in confirming their powers of
prognostication, Professor Beatty concludes that the workers who were
adversely affected by them can take little solace in being left out in the
cold.

Even before the Charter of Rights' was entrenched in the
Canadian Constitution in April of 1982, a vigorous debate had
begun, among both lawyers and politicians, about the desirability of
inserting a process of constitutional review into our system of
government. Especially among those on the political and legal left,
there was an acute awareness that, however alluring the idea of
human rights, constitutionalizing their protection in a written bill of
rights would necessarily and unavoidably enhance the power of the
judiciary relative to the other two, elected branches of government
and that caused them considerable concern.
Nowhere was this disquiet more deeply felt than among
those individuals familiar with how judges and the courts had treated
disadvantaged members of society and, in particular, members of the
working class. In a word, the courts' treatment of the interests of
Copyright, 1991, David M. Beatty.
*

Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.

1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAcq 1982, being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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workers since the Industrial Revolution and, indeed, even before is

deplorable 2 The history of Anglo-Canadian common law of
employment (of "masters" and their "servants" as it was once called)
is one of crude design and overt manipulation of legal doctrine - of
property, tort, contract, and crime - to disempower workers as
individuals and as a group. Vague and arbitrary legal categories, like
conspiracy, intimidation, inducing breach of contractual relations, and
secondary action, were manufactured by judges out of whole cloth
to render unlawful the most important tools workers had - unions,
strikes, boycotts, picketing, et cetera - to make their voices heard.
Other judicial creations, such as the fellow-servant rule or rules of
termination and employment security, made workers materially even
more vulnerable.
On the basis of their knowledge of the history of the rules
of labour law that had been developed and applied by the courts,
highly respected legal scholars argued that workers and trade unions
in Canada should not put their faith in the Charter and the process
of constitutional review.3 In their view, nothing in the nature of the
2 Descriptions of how the courts have developed the common law rules of employment
over the course of the past century and a half abound and are uniform in their depiction of
how this body of law has consistently favoured the interests of the employer and commercial
classes. See, for example, H.W. Arthurs, "Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for
Canada's Second Century' (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 786; H.W. Arthurs, D.D. Carter & HJ.
Glasbeek, Labour Law and IndustrialRelations in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984);
D.M. Beatty, "Labour is Not a Commodity" in B. Reiter & J. Swan, eds, Studies in Contract
Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) 313; L Christie, Employment Law in Canada (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1980); I. Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Torts: A Comparative
Study of the Law in England and Canada (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's
University, 1967); and HJ. Glasbeek, "Voluntarism, Liberalism and Grievance Arbitration:
Holy Grail, Romance, and Real Life" and E. Tucker, "The Persistence of Market Regulation
of Occupational Health and Safety: The Stillbirth of Voluntarism" in G. England, ed., Essays
in Labour Relations Law (Toronto: CCH Canadian, 1986) 57 and 219. And see, generally,
K. Wedderbum, The Worker and the Law (Middlesex: Penguin, 1965) and 0. Kahn-Freund,
Labour and the Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1972).
3 See, for example, H.W. Arthurs, "'The Right to Golf': Reflections on the Future of
Workers, Unions and the Rest of Us Under the Charter" and J.A. Fudge, "Labour, The New
Constitution and Old Style Liberalism" in Labour Law Under the Charter(Kingston: Queen's
Law Journal & Industrial Relations Centre, 1988) 17 and 61; J.C. Bakan, "Constitutional
Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor What You
Need)" in R. Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1990) 445; HJ. Glasbeek, "Contempt for Workers" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall LJ.
1 and "Workers of the World Avoid the Charterof Rights" (April 1987) 21 Can. Dimensions
12; R.A. Hasson, "What's Your Favourite Right? The Charter and Income Maintenance
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Charterwas likely to alter the behaviour or class bias of the courts.
Their recommendation was that workers and their unions should
deliberately refrain from using the Charterwhenever it was possible
to do so and concentrate their energies on urging reform in the
legislative and political arenas. Their preferred legal strategy was to
suffocate the Charter with silence and neglect.
The suggested course of action of ignoring and marginalizing
the impact of the Charter was not, however, to come to pass. At
least not overnight. Rather, in several cases, individual workers,
their dependants, and their unions rejected the caution which these
pundits had preached and mounted challenges against the
constitutionality of a number of laws which, in their view, offended
their constitutional guarantees. Complaints were filed against laws
restricting the freedom of different groups of workers to strike,
picket, engage in various forms of political activity, and work beyond
arbitrarily imposed mandatory retirement dates. As well, unions and
their supporters were drawn into constitutional discourse defending
laws which protected their interests against attacks by individuals and
groups who were generally cool if not hostile to the organized
labour movement.4
Although it has turned out that those who were generally
suspicious of judges and procedures like constitutional review have
not been able to witness the immediate decline, let alone the
demise, in the involvement of judges in our system of government
which they had hoped would transpire, there are certain features of
the courts' record from which sceptics and critics can draw a certain
amount of satisfaction. For one thing, the judgments concerning the
application of the Charter to the rules of labour and employment
law vindicate their claims about the tendency of the courts to

Legislation" (1989) 5 J. L & Soc. Pol'y 1; M. MacNeil, "Courts and Liberal Ideology. An

Analysis of the Application of the Charterto Some Labour Law Issues" (1989) 34 McGill L.J.
87; T.G. Ison, 'The Sovereignty of the Judiciary" (1986) 27 C. de D. 501; M. Mandel, The
Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson,

1989); A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden Agenda" (1987) 45 Advocate
857; A. Petter & A.C. Hutchinson, "Rights in Conflict: The Dilemma of Charter Legitimacy"
(1989) 23 U.B.C. L Rev. 531; and P.C. Weiler, "The Charter at Work: Reflections on the
Constitutionalizing of Labour and Employment Law" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 117.
4 Most, if not all, of the early labour cases involving the Charterare catalogued in Weiler,
ibid. at 191-212.
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manipulate legal doctrine and cases to the detriment of workers and
their dependants. Just as the sceptics predicted, the Supreme Court
of Canada's Charter decisions on labour and employment law read
as the latest chapter in an uninterrupted tale, whose beginnings
reach back to the Industrial Revolution and even earlier times. A
close reading of the Charterdecisions which the Supreme Court has
authored shows precisely the same bias against the interests of
workers and their unions that plagued the common law rules of tort
and crime employed by the judges to control the behaviour of the
working class throughout most of the nineteenth and first half of the
twentieth centuries.
Analytically, the quality of the reasoning used by the
members of the Supreme Court of Canada to support their Charter
judgments is just as flawed as that which impugned their earlier
common law rulings, or perhaps even worse. In each case in which
it dismissed a complaint that some part of our labour law was
constitutionally impaired, the Supreme Court committed errors of
logic, interpretation, and doctrinal analysis of the most basic and
crudest form. Similar to the mistakes infecting the earlier common
law rules governing dismissal, accidents, strikes, picketing, et cetera,
the Court's Charterdecisions on employment law provide an equally
legitimate basis on which critics can continue to challenge the
objectivity of the law and the integrity of the courts.
The first case the Court heard challenging the
constitutionality of a rule of labour law was Dolphin Delivery,5 a case
almost certainly destined to become as infamous as the much
maligned decision of the u.s. Supreme Court in Lochner v. N.Y. 6
Dolphin Delivery has been condemned in virtually all quarters and
stands, without question, as the most criticized judgment the
Supreme Court has issued on the Charter.7 At issue was a common
5 RW.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery].
6 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7 Many of these critiques are collected in D.M. Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes:
The CanadianProduction of Constitutional Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) c. 4, n. 60
[hereinafter TalkingHeads and the Supremes]. See Weiler's discussion of the case, supra, note
3. Incredibly, in their judgment in the mandatory retirement cases, the majority reaffirmed
the Court's decision in Dolphin Delivery without even referring to the deluge of criticism which
Dolphin Delivery has attracted. Although recognizing and attempting to respond to some of
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law rule restricting the freedom of workers to engage in picketing
activity. Although everyone on the Court, except Jean Beetz, was
prepared to accept the idea that picketing was a protected form of
expression within section 2(b) of the Charter,the judges unanimously
dismissed the picketers' claim on the ground that the common law
rules which governed their relations with the company did not fall
within the reach of the Charter or their own powers of review.
Even without reading a word of the judgment the Court
wrote to justify this sweeping restriction on the scope of the Charter,
a moment's reflection should make clear the central defect on which
it is based. Logically, (or structurally)8 the decision in Dolphin
Delivery cannot stand because it turns the entire organization of our
system of government, and the place of the Constitution, on its
head. In putting the judge-made rules of contracts, property, tort,
et cetera, beyond the reach of the Charter whenever they regulate
the behaviour of two or more individuals or groups, the Court
disregarded the principle of constitutional supremacy enshrined in
section 52 of the Charter. It elevated its own rules to a position
above and beyond the Constitution itself. It reversed the hierarchy
that logically exists between constitutions and ordinary, subordinate
law and, in so doing, licensed the judges and the third branch of
government to exercise their legal authority free of any
constitutional constraints.
Legally, the judgment is grounded on an equally egregious
mistake. As Brian Slattery was quick to point out, the distinction
which the Court tried to draw between its own rules of common law
and the law (statutes, regulations) initiated by the other two
branches of government, cannot withstand the most basic legal
analysis. 9 The legal authority the courts exercise whenever they

these critiques in her dissent, Bertha Wilson avoided responding to the structural, logical
argument described in the paragraph. See Mcnmney v. University of Gue~ph, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
229 [hereinafter McIlnney].
8 The characterization of "logical" arguments as "structural" in nature is made by P.
Bobbitt in "Methods of Constitutional Argument" (1989) 23 U.B.C. L Rev. 449 [hereinafter
ConstitutionalArgument]. See P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New

York. Oxford University Press, 1982).
9 B. Slattery, "The Charter's Relevance to Private Litigation: Does Do~phin Deliver?"
(1987) 32 McGill L.J. 905.
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apply principles of common law to resolve a dispute between
different individuals or interests in the community has exactly the
same grounding as that which is exercised by any agent or arm of
the state. Like any administrative agency or government official,
the power of the courts to effect legal relations by common law
principles is itself grounded in statutes. As Slattery explained, the
federal Parliament and every provincial legislature has, either at the
time of confederation or subsequently upon its joining Canada,
adopted acts of incorporation, making authoritative the common law
rules which were then in existence. Common law principles, in
short, are no different from the rules applied by any arm or branch
of the state. They are grounded in statutes, draw their legitimacy
from the legislative branch and are, therefore, equally within and
°
subordinate to the principle of constitutional supremacy
Nothing in Dolphin Delivery (or in its more recent ruling on
the constitutionality of rules of mandatory retirement)11 can repair
these fundamental logical and legal failings. Reduced to its
essentials, the Court put forward two different arguments to support
its position, neither of which can withstand scrutiny. First, the
judges made a textual argument based on section 32. According to
William McIntyre, who wrote this judgment for the Court (and
Gerard La Forest who repeated the argument in McKinney), the
words of section 32 make it clear that it was the intention of those
who entrenched the Charter that it was only to apply to the
10 The glaring inconsistency in drawing a line between statutory and common law rules
of any kind is manifested in the Court's decisions in Dolphin Delivery and Slaight
Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 [hereinafter Slaight Conmunications].
As a result of the decisions the Court handed down in these two cases, people whose dismissal
is governed by the common law rules of termination will receive no protection from the
Charter,while those whose termination must conform to standards of just cause will be able
to insist those standards themselves met the principles of review which the Charter contains.
Both the majority and dissenting judgments in the mandatory retirement cases
clearly recognized the relevance of their decision in Slaight Communications to their ruling in
McMnney, supra, note 7 and both discussed it at length. Neither, however, addressed the
inconsistency in treatment between judicial and administrative tribunals, although Bertha
Wilson's discussion of the academic comment on Dolphin Delivery indicates she was aware of
it. Nor did any of the judges recognize the inconsistency of grounding their right to review
arbitral rulings on the basis that arbitrators derive all their powers from statutes, while
ignoring the legislative base of their own legal authority.
11 In Mcnney, supra, note 7, the Court reaffirmed its ruling in Dolphin Delivery that the
Charter has no application to "private" law.
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executive and legislative branches of government and not to the
courts. In effect, McIntyre argued, the reach of the Charter was
dependent upon and varied with the person or persons seeking to
have any given law enforced.
Now, we have already seen how this argument ignores or
avoids the historical fact that all common law in Canada is itself
grounded in acts of all of the legislatures and so, on that ground
alone, falls within the Charter's reach. In addition, however, in
reading the Court's judgment, it can also be seen that, in advancing
this proposition, the Court abandoned the interpretive method it had
consistently endorsed in all of its most important decisions leading
up to its judgment in this case. Essentially, rather than read the
word "government" in section 32 liberally, in accordance with its
conventional meaning 2 and in light of the larger objectives of the
Charter, the Court chose the definition which it claimed was held
by those who were legally responsible for the actual entrenchment
of the Charter in 1982.
Although, at first blush, it might seem that giving effect to
the intention of those who were most involved with adding the
process of constitutional review to our system of government is the
most natural and appropriate approach to take, nothing could be
further from the truth. Both empirically and theoretically, there are
enormous problems in relying on the intention of the "framers" of
a constitution to give meaning to the words in its text.13 To all of
these difficulties, the Court was completely oblivious. For example,
there was no evidence as to what the intention of those provincial
and federal legislators who adopted the Charter actually was with

12 Both lawyers and political scientists recognize that when it is written in the lower case,
"government" in modern, liberal-democratic states embraces the judiciary as the third branch.
See P.H. Russell, The Judieiay in Canada. The Third Branch of Government (Toronto:
McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987) at 1 and D. Gibson, The Law of the Charter: GeneralPinciples
(Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 195. Even read literally, the text of section 32 supports the
interpretation of the word government to include the judicial as well as the executive branch
of government. As Dale Gibson has stressed, the use of the lower case, rather than
capitalizing the "G" in governments, is strong support for the wider definition.
13 See Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra, note 7 at 19-22.
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respect to its application to the rules of common law.14 Nor was
there any reference to the theoretical difficulties of using intention
as a dictionary, so to speak, for constitutional texts. The Court
simply asserted that the Charterwas not intended to apply to private
disputes based on common law rules developed by the courts and so
could be of no assistance to the picketers in the instant case.
The second reason McIntyre (and again La Forest for the
majority in Mclinney) gave to justify his decision in Dolphin Delivery
that the Charter had no application to private litigation based on
principles of common law was essentially a prudential one. 5 In his
opinion, the Court and the process of constitutional review was not
well-suited to resolve cases of this kind. According to McIntyre,
these kinds of disputes are better handled by human rights tribunals
and other agencies dealing with similar sorts of complaints. In
support of this position, McIntyre was able to call on the writings of
several academic commentators
who seemed to have endorsed a
16
argument.
of
line
similar
Regardless of the pragmatic appeal and academic pedigree
such a line of analysis may enjoy, it remains fundamentally flawed.
In reasoning this way, the Court embraced an analytical method I
like to call the technique of "avoidance.' 17 Essentially, the method
involves the Court focusing on a set of ideas or facts which simply
are not relevant to a challenger's claim.
The mistake the Court made in referring to human rights
codes as an alternative source of relief in cases of this kind was in
thinking that the two processes are, to some extent, substitutes for
each other. The reality, of course, is that human rights codes and

14 Incredibly, in his judgment in McKimney, supra, note 7, Gerard La Forest explicitly
acknowledged that there is no evidence available which would suggest what reason the framers
of the Constitution would have had for excluding the judicial branch from the Charter. For
her part, the only evidence Bertha Wilson was able to elicit about the framers' intent was a
reference to the testimony given by one bureaucrat, a Mr. J.Jordan, at the time, senior
counsel, Public Law, Department of Justice.
15

Again, the terminology is borrowed from Bobbitt. See ConstitutionalArgument, supra,

note 8.
16

Dohin Deivery, supra, note 5 at 191-93.

17 Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra, note 7 at 88ff.
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the Charteroperate at two very different levels in our legal system.18
Human rights codes regulate the physical behaviour of individuals
towards their fellow citizens, in their homes, at work, and at play.
The Charter,by contrast, regulates the content and quality of the
law used by the state to co-ordinate those affairs including, as the
Court itself recognized, the human rights codes themselves.
The fact that human rights codes have been enacted to
regulate certain aspects of private relations in a community provides
no reason why other laws and rules that govern how each of us
must interact with others in the community (including the common
law rules of contract, property, and, in the case of Dolphin Delivery,
tort) should be immune from the process of judicial review and
elevated to a status beyond or above the principle of constitutional
supremacy. There simply is no logical connection between the idea
that we already have human rights codes to control how each of us
must treat others in various situations in our daily affairs and a
ruling that other aspects of the law we use to co-ordinate personal
relations in the community do not have to conform to the principle
of constitutional supremacy. To press the connection, as the Court
does, is to commit a logical error - known to logicians and lawyers
as a non sequitur - of the most basic and glaring kind. It simply
does not follow from the assumption that the Charter is not meant
to control the behaviour of individuals in their private lives that
there is a body of rules devised by the third branch of government
that stands above, or at least alongside, the Constitution. Paralleling
its impact on foreign governments and the laws they enact, the
Charter will also affect the private affairs of individuals and groups
whenever they rely on a body of rules that limits the entitlements
the Constitution guarantees.
Although Dolphin Delivery certainly is the most notorious
judgment the Court has issued to date, it is not so qualitatively
18 This eventually was recognized in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter Andrews].
19

Because of the Court's confusion of the different roles that are played by constitutions
and human rights laws, there is a belief that applying the Charter to the common law will
overwhelm the courts and strangle freedom in the country. The reality is that the Charter
only governs the rules of tort, contracts, et cetera, devised by the courts and not the behaviour
of private individuals themselves.
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different from its other labour decisions. In all three cases in the
Labour Trilog 20 and more recently again in P.LP.S.,2 1 the Court can
be shown to be guilty of precisely the same kinds of logical,
interpretive, doctrinal, and analytical mistakes which plague its
decision in Dolphin Delivery. These decisions manifest the same
kind of structural or logical failing as the one which undermines the
legitimacy of its decision in Dolphin Delivery. In the Labour Trilogy
and in p.A..s., the Court narrowed the reach of the Charter even
further than the restrictions established in Dolphin Delivery by
excluding any law bearing on the freedom of workers to strike and
bargain collectively from the protection of section 2(d) of the
Charter and the process of constitutional review. Like the common
law rules governing picketing by and of private individuals, this body
of law - regulating the most fundamental activities engaged in by
workers to maintain some control over the most basic aspects of
their daily lives - was put beyond the reach of the Charter and the
requirement of judicial review. In the same way Dolphin Delivery
reversed the hierarchy that exists between a constitution and
ordinary common law, in these cases, the Court elevated the most
important parts of the legal regime we use to regulate relations in
the workplace to a position above, or at least, alongside the
Constitution itself. In these cases, as in Dolphin Delivery, the Court
once again ignored and, in the end, contravened the principle of
constitutional supremacy in section 52.
In fact, in these cases, the Court compounded its mistake
because, in "reasoning" this way, it held constitutional a set of laws
which, as the dissenting opinions clearly caution, needlessly and
gratuitously restricted the freedom of a large number of workers to
act inways (selecting a union, engaging in a strike) most likely to
give them some influence in the decision-making processes in the
enterprises in which they toil. In the Labour Trilogy, the Court
affirmed the constitutional validity of half a dozen labour laws

20 Reference Re Alberta Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313;
P.S.A.C v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 [hereinafter P.S.A.C]; R-W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan,

[1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
21 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories

(Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 [hereinafter P.I.PS.].
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prohibiting, to varying degrees, different groups of workers from
being able to strike and to engage in collective bargaining, even
though it could be shown that the proscriptions were drawn more
broadly than was required to accomplish the purposes of the acts.
For example, in Reference Re Alberta Public Service Employee
Relations Act,22 the majority ruled that a law passed by the Alberta
Legislature, prohibiting strikes by all public servants in order to
ensure uninterrupted provision of essential services affecting lives,
health, and safety in the community, was constitutional even though
it applied to many people who did not perform emergency services
of that kind. Similarly, in the P.s.A3 case, a law limiting the
freedom of federal public servants to strike and to engage in
collective bargaining, passed as part of that government's attempt
to bring an inflationary economy under control, was judged to be
constitutional even though it restricted the freedom of these workers
to strike and to bargain collectively with respect to important
matters (like arbitration, seniority, or management rights) which had
nothing to do with wages or compensation of any kind. In both
decisions, the freedom of large numbers of workers was needlessly
compromised. 24 Laws drafted much too broadly, with restrictions
much wider than required to accomplish the Government's
objectives, were allowed to stand. If the laws had been more
carefully drawn, the freedom of non-essential workers in Alberta and
all federal public servants could have been shown greater respect
without doing any violence to the objectives each of those
governments was pursuing.
In A.P.S., the Court ruled that the labour relations statute
governing the working lives of public servants in the Northwest
Territories was constitutional, even though it imposed unprecedented

22 Supra, note 20.
23 Supra, note 20.
24 Note that this was also the effect of the Court's decision in McKinney, supra, note 7
and the related mandatory retirement cases. Here, the Court upheld rules of termination
which were blatantly discriminatory - both to the elderly and women - even though there was
evidence before it to suggest that, in other jurisdictions in Canada and throughout the United
States, the objectives which underlie these rules (faculty renewal, academic excellence,
protection of pension plans) could be accomplished with alternate rules and procedures which
were not as discriminatory.
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restrictions on the freedom of workers to bargain through unions
of their own choosing. Despite the fact that this piece of legislation
limited the freedom that other public servants and private employees
enjoy all across the country, the Court ruled that it was
constitutionally valid. Without requiring the Government of the
Northwest Territories to show why it did not adopt or adapt one of
the standard certification procedures prevailing in all other collective
bargaining statutes which allow workers much more freedom in
choosing and changing their unions, the Court ruled it was perfectly
constitutional for the government to design a system in which it
retained final authority over which bargaining agent any group of
employees could use.
Like its decision in Dolphin Delivery, the Court offered
nothing in any of these judgments which addresses, let alone
responds to, the structural and logical failings which impugn their
legitimacy. Instead, it invoked the same kind of interpretive,
analytical, and doctrinal arguments which proved to be so wanting in
Dolphin Delivery. Thus, in the Labour Trilogy, the majority of the
Court opted for a minimalist construction of section 2(d) which is
the antithesis of the conventional (purposeful) approach used in the
interpretation of constitutional texts. It simply assumed that the
narrowest range of activities related to the organization and
objectives of an association was the exhaustive definition of the text.
No explanation was offered as to why the words "freedom of
association" should not be defined in terms of the larger purposes
which the Charter was meant to serve, like any other constitutional
guarantee, even though this was precisely the approach followed by
the two dissenting judges, Brian Dickson and Bertha Wilson.
In addition to grounding its decision in the Labour Trilogy on
an interpretation of the language of the Charter,which is quite out
of keeping with the constitutional stature of its text, the interpretive
approach relied on by the majority was quite inconsistent with the
analytical structure which the Court has repeatedly stressed is
implicit in the Charteritself. As described in the landmark case of
R v. Oakes,25 the process of constitutional review can be divided
into two phases which, as the Court has emphasized, are completely
25 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
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separate and analytically quite distinct. In the first stage, the person
challenging a law tries to persuade the court that one of their rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter (religion, association,
equality, et cetera) has been infringed in some way. To accomplish
this, the challengers have to establish two separate things. First,
they have to show that the interest or activity which they have asked
the court to protect is one which falls within one of the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. It is at this point in the
proceedings that interpretive questions about what interests and
activities are protected by the Charterwould be answered. Second,
assuming they have successfully surmounted the interpretive hurdle,
the challengers would also have to prove that the law they were
challenging really did constrain people in the ways that they claimed.
They would have to prove, as a matter of fact, that their
constitutional freedom had been burdened by the law they attacked.
In contrast with the rules governing ordinary debates, the
second stage of the review process is not automatic. It is only
undertaken where the person complaining about a law is able to
satisfy the court of the validity of both the legal (interpretive) and
factual bases of their claims. If the complainants fail in either of
these tasks, their case will be dismissed and there would be no
occasion for the court to proceed to the second stage. Where,
however, it can be shown that the challenged law does limit an
interest or activity which falls within one of the guaranteed rights
or freedoms, the court embarks on the second, "justificatory" stage
of the review process. In this phase of the debate, it is the
Using the principles the Court
government's turn to talk.
summarized in Oakes, those defending the constitutionality of a law
endeavour to show that it is the kind of rule or regulation that can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, even
though it limits the rights and freedoms of some of its members.
Like the burden which challengers must bear, there are two distinct
issues a government must address if it is successfully to defend the
constitutionality of a challenged law. Not only must it establish the
importance of the public interest which a challenged law was
expected to promote, but it must also justify the integrity of its
particular approach - its means - as well. A government has to
explain both the advantages of the social policies it has chosen to
enact into law and why there were no other alternative means
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available which would have impinged less on people's constitutional
freedom.
In the Labour Trilogy, the Court paid no heed to this
structure or framework of analysis. Essentially, it collapsed the two
phases of the review process by considering, and ultimately being
very deferential to, the public interest promoted by the laws under
review in the first interpretive stage of its analysis. Contrary to its
own admonitions that the two phases of the review process are
analytically distinct and must be kept separate and apart, the Court
adopted a very deferential posture in the first phase of the review
process in defining what interests and activities were protected by
the Charter's guarantee of freedom of association. The Court's
explanation for why none of the challengers' constitutional rights
had been violated was short and to the point. Strikes and collective
bargaining were said to be activities that were notoriously subject to
balancing and compromise and on which the elected branches of
government had a good deal more expertise than the Court. Labour
relations, said Gerald Le Dain, was a subject on which the judges
were not comparatively well equipped to review the merits of social
policy and they should therefore defer on these issues to the
legislature. Based on this assessment of its own relative lack of
expertise, the Court interpreted the words "freedom of association"
in a way to provide no protection to one of the most fundamental
activities by which individuals can maintain some measure of control
over their working lives.
Defining which interests and activities are protected by the
Charter by examining and weighing the public interest that is
promoted by challenged law is not a legitimate method of
approaching the Charterfor a variety of different reasons.2 6 As an
interpretive device it again turns on its head the hierarchical
relationship which exists between constitutional and statutory
instruments. Rather than using the Charterto evaluate the content
of ordinary law, the latter is used to give meaning to the
Constitution. As well, reasoning in this way reverses how the
burden of proof in Charter cases must be assigned. It results in the
complainant, rather than the government, having to establish how
26

The full argument is set out in Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra, note 7 at 99ff.
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the competing interests affected by the challenged law should be
weighted. Indeed, it was precisely by failing to see the fundamental
difference in the purpose of the two stages of the review process
that the Court was led, in the Labour Trilogy, to hold constitutional
laws which restricted people's freedom quite unnecessarily.
In the PAP.s. decision, those forming the majority of the
Court relied on very similar lines of argument. For the most part,
these members of the Court felt the challenge they had been asked
to adjudicate could be resolved by a simple doctrinal argument.27 In
their view, the challenge to section 42(1)(b) of the Northwest
Territories' Public Service Act28 was governed by its earlier decision
in the Labour Trilogy. According to the majority in P...s., in the
Labour Trilogy, the Court had ruled that not only did strike activity
not fall within the protection of section 2(d), neither did any other
aspect of collective bargaining. Although, as the dissenting judgment
of Peter Cory makes clear, this is a fair reading of the judgment
Gerald Le Dain wrote for himself and two other judges in the
Labour Trilogy. It is equally clear that such a reading cannot be
given to the concurring reasons of William McIntyre which were
crucial to the outcome of those cases. As Cory correctly points out,
in the P.sAc case, which formed part of the Labour Trilogy, William
McIntyre expressly disassociated himself from this view and said
explicitly that he was leaving open the possibility that other aspects
of collective bargaining - in addition to strikes - might receive

Charter protection under the guarantee in section 2(d).
As well as misusing a doctrinal argument by citing a case as
authority for a proposition for which it cannot stand, each of the
opinions authored by the judges who formed the majority on the
Court relied on one or other of the methods of reasoning that were
invoked in Dolphin Delivery and the Labour Trilogy and, as we have
already seen, are flawed in some very basic way. The central
opinion written by John Sopinka is a classic example of the strategy
of avoidance which we saw was so central to the Court's decision in
Dolphin Delivery. Here, while repeating again and again that the
law in question had no impact on the existence of P.LP.s. as an
27 See ConstitutionalArgument, supra, note 8.

28 R.S.N.W.T. 1974, c. P-13.
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association and that no person had actually been prohibited from
joining that organization, Sopinka simply ignored the essence of the
challenger's claim which, as noted by the minority, was that the law
made it virtually impossible for P.i.p.s. to maintain the membership
of those individuals whose employment had been transferred from
the federal government to that of the Northwest Territories.29 As
the dissent pointed out, whatever the law still permitted individual
workers to do, it put tremendous pressure on them to belong to one
particular union and made it practically impossible for them to ever
change their situation.
In addition to failing to address the central complaint that
the challengers had with the way in which the Northwest Territories'
law interfered with their association, the judgments of John Sopinka
and Brian Dickson suffered from a logical and structural failure.
Both of these judges, as well as La Forest and L'Heureux-Dub6 who
concurred, thought persuasive the argument that, because it was
conceded that the Government of the Northwest Territories was
under no duty to enact any scheme of collective bargaining for its
own employees, it "logically" followed that whatever limitations the
law contained could not attract review under section 2(d). As
Dickson wrote, "If s. 2(d) does not guarantee the right to bargain
collectively, I fail to understand how it can guarantee a right to any
particular bargaining agent."30
The answer, of course, is that, on the model of review
envisaged in Oakes, the central focus of the judicial process is on
the means which a government employs when it chooses to act, not
on what any government's agenda ought to be. As the entire record
of the Supreme Court's performance makes abundantly clear, means,
not ends, are what the Charter and the process of review are all
about. Other than one early and isolated exception,3 1 the Court has
never imposed any restrictions on what objectives a government may,
29 Although Sopinka makes reference to the fact that there is no evidence that any of
the employees who were affected by the transfer of their employment from the federal to the
Northwest Territories government still wished to be represented by P.IP.S., he fails to see,
in this fact, the very powerful (and coercive) influence the challenged law exerted on their
freedom to associate in organizations of their own choosing.
30
P..P.S., supra, note 21 at 5.
31

AG. Quebec v. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66.
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let alone must, pursue. Conversely, on every occasion the Court
struck down a law as violating a constitutional guarantee, it was
because it was satisfied that alternative policies - alternative means
- existed which would have allowed a government to accomplish its
objectives, but would have limited human freedom and the rights in
the Charter even less.3 2
On this very clear orientation of all of the Court's decisions
over the first six years it has worked with the Charter, the logic
should have been clear that it is precisely when government decides
to take action that the Court's powers of review can be invoked.
Rather than being illogical, it is the very essence of a process of
constitutional review that the Court must be scrupulously vigilant in
guaranteeing "the unremitting protection of human rghts'33 in every
case in which lawmakers have decided to exercise their legal
authority and to infuse one particular social policy with the coercive
authority of law. Although there is still some controversy over
whether the Court has the power to tell a government when it must
act, there should be no doubt that whenever a government does
exercise the legal powers of the state, the process of review may be
engaged.
The Supreme Court's general antipathy to the interests of
workers in the two other cases in which it rejected Charter
challenges they have initiated is manifested slightly differently, but
no less dramatically than in the cases we have just reviewed. In
contrast with its treatment of strikes, picketing, and collective
bargaining in general, the Court's judgments in Reference Re
Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld.)34 and B.C.G.E.U. v. A.G.
British Columbia35 are not, for the most part, marked by or
predicated on the analytical errors and leaps of logic which make so
clear the Court's true allegiances. However, in both decisions, all of
the judges make very plain, quite openly and directly, that they rank

32 See Talldng Heads and the Supremens supra, note 7 at 112-19.
33

Hnter v. Southam, [1984] 2 $.C.R. 145 at 155.

34 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922 [hereinafter Workers' Compensation Reference].
35 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 [hereinafter B.CG.U.].
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the property, contracts, and related interests of various members of
the community far ahead of the interests of the working class.
In the Workers' Compensation Reference, at stake was a
section, common to all workers' compensation legislation across the
country, denying workers and their dependants the opportunity to
sue their employers for injuries they suffered as a result of the
negligence of the employer, no matter how grievous the injury nor
deficient the behaviour. In two sentences, the Court dismissed the
challenge on the ground that workers could not fit within the
protected grounds of discrimination set out in section 15 as that
36
section had been interpreted in its earlier decision in Andrews.
By basing its judgment on its earlier ruling in Andrews, the
Court made it as clear as it possibly could how little it thought the
interests of workers are worth. Leaving aside the very serious
interpretive error committed by the Court in Andrews in rejecting
the "similarly situated" test,3 7 the contrast between the results of the
two cases provides critics with extraordinarily strong evidence
supporting their claim of a consistent, anti-worker bias in the courts.
InAndrews, the successful challengers were non-Canadians who were
otherwise qualified to practise law in Canada. According to the
Court, a law which discriminated against lawyers because of their
citizenship status was the kind of legal classification or stereotyping
which the Charter was meant to prohibit. By contrast, in the
Workers' Compensation Reference, the Court asserted that of all
accident victims it was perfectly proper to deny workers any access
to the courts 3 Only immigrant lawyers, not indigenous workers,
were able to claim the protection of the equality guarantees of the
Charter, unquestionably one of the most important entitlements
which any constitution can provide.
36

Supra, note 18.

37 See M. Gold, Case Comment on Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989)
34 McGill L.J. 1063; W. Black & L. Smith, Case Comment on Andrews v. Law Society of
British Columbia (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 591 at 600; and Talking Heads and the Supremes,
supra, note 7 at 73.
38 The discriminatory treatment endured by workers in the area of accident compensation
has been compounded in recent years by the enactment of no fault, automobile insurance
schemes which preserve some opportunity for accident victims to sue in tort. See, for
example, InsuranceStatute Law Amedment Act 1990, S.O. 1990, c. 2.
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Although it is possible to identify both doctrinal and
analytical errors in B.GG.-u similar to those which mar its other
decisions dealing with strikes and picketing, 39 the Court's decision is
unique and most striking for how openly and blatantly it discounted
the importance of the workers' interests in publicizing their labour
dispute with the Social Credit government of the day. The Court's
decision in .cG.E 11.is exceptional because, of all of the cases so far
examined, it was the only one in which the Court felt obliged to
evaluate the competing interests involved in the case against the
proportionality principles embedded in section 1.
In B.CG.E.u., the Court was asked to rule on the
constitutionality of an ex parte injunction issued by the Chief Justice
of British Columbia restraining an otherwise lawful picket line that
had been set up around various courthouses in the province in
conjunction with a legal strike of provincial employees. Although
the Court agreed with the challengers that the injunction had
restricted their freedom of expression, it ruled that the limitation
was justified under section 1 because it constituted only a "minimal
interference" with their rights compared to the "massive disruption"
of the courts and with the legal rights of all citizens in British
Columbia.
To appreciate fully just how little the Court thought the
interests of workers weighed in the balance, it is necessary to read
a full account of the case. Suffice it to say that at no point in the
judgment was the Court able to refer to any actual prejudice which
the picketing caused. On the evidence before the Court, it was
uncontested that the union had set up a pass system to allow duty
counsel and others associated with cases which involved individuals
in custody to pass through the picket line without violating its ethic
of solidarity. In addition, there was sworn evidence that, at least
outside the courthouse in Vancouver, people did pass freely in and
out of the building without being impeded in any way by the pickets.
Apart from the delay that might be caused by people respecting the
picket line, all of the injuries the Court foresaw were entirely
speculative. Witnesses, said the Court, "could well" have been

See Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra, note 7 at 97 and P. Macklem
"Developments in Employment Law: The 1988-89 Term" (1990) 1 Sup. Ct L Rev. 405.
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deterred. Criminal cases "would undoubtedly" not have been
processed with dispatch. At no point, however, did the Court
endeavour to evaluate whether, with the pass system in place, the
most pressing cases could be processed in the usual way. Rather
than make a serious and informed inquiry about precisely what
interests would be prejudiced by the presence of the picket line, the
Court simply assumed that, whatever they were, they counted more
than the workers' interest in being able to communicate with others
in the community about their labour dispute and ultimately about
the conditions under which they were obliged to work.
In the result, the Charter decisions related to labour and
employment law issued by the Supreme Court of Canada have, with
one exception, all been of one kind.40 The reasons advanced by the
Court to justify dismissing virtually all of the Charter challenges
mounted by workers, their dependants, and their unions provide
additional grist for the critics' and sceptics' mill. The analytical
errors, logical gaps, and doctrinal distortions distinguish the Court's
review of laws which, on a standard application of the
proportionality principles in section 1, seem unduly Draconian and
heavy-handed. These decisions follow precisely the pattern of
judicial law-making that has been reflected in the common law of
employment and labour relations over the past century and a half.
The sceptics can claim fairly that, as a matter of positive law, their
prognostication about what course Charterjurisprudence was likely
to take in the area of labour law has proven to be exactly right.
In addition to claiming some facility in predicting how the
Court was likely to behave with the Charter in its hands, sceptics of
law and critics of courts can also take some solace from the fact
that, even though various unions and individual workers did not
listen to their advice from the start, it is almost certain that their

40 The one exception to this unbroken refrain, denying workers any Charterrelief, is the
Court's decision in Slaight Communications,supra, note 10 where it was recognized that the
reasoning and rulings of adjudicators under statutory regimes must conform to the Charter.
What impact the Court's decision in Slaight Communications will eventually have is uncertain.
Clearly, the Court did not see its ruling in Slaight Communications overturning its judgment
in Dolhin Delivery, supra, note 5. On the other hand, if generally recognized arbitral
principles, like "management rights," will now be subject to review against the proportionality
principles embedded in section 1, the Charter may still be able to inject a measure of social
justice in the workplace which it currently lacks.
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initial call for the marginalization of the Charter in the area of
labour and employment law will now be heard. Future litigants now
have clear evidence that the Charterhas not changed how the Court
weighs the interests of workers, nor has it discouraged the Court
from manipulating and distorting traditional sources of reasoning to
reach a desired result. In addition, almost paradoxically, the results
which the Court has come to in each of the cases we have reviewed
has meant that virtually all of the most important parts of labour
law have now been put beyond the scope of the Charter and the
reach of judicial review.41 In concrete terms, the Court has now
ruled that all laws regulating strikes, picketing, and, indeed, all

41 Indeed, in their decisions in the mandatory retirement cases, all of the judges took as
settled the idea that, in addition to the basic rules of employment law, all or most social and
economic policies enacted by governments should be shielded from the full rigors of the
model of review in Oakes, supra, note 25. Drawing a distinction between social and economic
policies which seek to balance conflicting interests in the community from matters of criminal
law, both La Forest and Wilson suggest that only in the latter cases should the proportionality
principles in Oakes be applied to their full effect. In other cases, it is claimed, the Court
should mitigate the strictures of the proportionality principles and, in particular, the principle
of least drastic means by only requiring a government to establish it had a "reasonable basis"
for its belief that the policy or means it chose to enact into law was the least intrusive
available to it. It is not pertinent to the purposes of this essay to explore the soundness of
the distinction which the Court has drawn between social and economic policies on the one
hand and criminal matters on the other. As examples like abortion, pornography, hate
propaganda, or impaired driving make abundantly clear, criminal law, no less than social and
economic policy, involves balancing competing interests in a community. For my purposes,
the more important point is to note that the consequence of limiting the second
proportionality principle in Oakes in this way is to substantially attenuate the burden of proof
governments must bear in justifying laws which impinge on constitutional guarantees and to
allow for the validation of laws which needlessly restrict constitutional guarantees. In the
mandatory retirement cases, it permitted the Governments (and universities) of Ontario and
B.C. to avoid having to explain why they did not follow the lead of other provinces, the
federal government, and many institutions in the U.SA in outlawing rules of mandatory
retirement. The fact that mandatory retirement has been abolished in these jurisdictions
provided strong evidence that all of the benefits for which mandatory retirement rules were
acclaimed could be realized with alternative policies and procedures which would be free of
the discriminatory elements of the traditional mandatory retirement rules.
It should be stressed that, in addition to discriminating on the basis of age,
conventional mandatory retirement rules also discriminate on the basis of sex. What is
perhaps most defective about our current approach to mandatory retirement is that it uses
years of age, rather than years of service, to realize its purposes. Given that many women
take time out of their careers to raise families, the current rules are very prejudicial to
women. Even though they will routinely have fewer years of employment than their male
counterparts, they will be made to leave work at the same age. Given the kinds of
professional and academic jobs that were at stake in these cases, the financial loss individual
women will be required to endure will be considerable.
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aspects of collective bargaining lie beyond the scope of the Charter
and the process of constitutional review. As well, it has held that
workers cannot invoke the equality guarantees whenever a law
discriminates against them as members of the working class. Even
if their advice was slow to take hold, critics of the courts and
sceptics of written bills of rights can take some satisfaction in
knowing that, in the future, the Charteris not likely to distract the
energies and drain the resources of workers and their associations
from what for them is the more fundamental and productive work
of political and policy reform.
In the final analysis, then, the instincts and original
predictions of those who were sceptical and critical of modifying our
system of government by the addition of a process of constitutional
review has proven to be correct. The position they took against
those who were more sanguine about the Charter's prospects
essentially has prevailed. The debate largely has gone their way.
And yet, the victory that sceptics and critics can rightly claim against
"believers" in constitutional review must remain a very hollow and
pyrrhic one. Whatever taste of success they may savour must be
very bittersweet indeed.
Even if the cases the Supreme Court has decided so far
largely bear our their thesis that judges know no shame in using
legal, doctrinal, and analytical ploys to frustrate legitimate grievances
from members and associations of the working class, the substantive
results of these cases have left the workers involved and those in
similar situations unambiguously worse off. All workers are, in fact
and in law, now vulnerable to having their rights to strike and to
bargain through unions of their own choosing denied in the name
of the legislative will. Their right to picket and to express
themselves freely can be extinguished by any judge. Their claims to
equality of treatment with other individuals and groups can be
blatantly ignored by any government which does not regard them as
a natural or important part of its constituency.
In terms of lost opportunities, the costs are all too clear.
Had the dissenting judgments in the Labour Trilogy and the P.i.s.
decisions carried the day, workers would know that they would be
protected against extremist governments bent on passing Draconian
laws limiting their right to strike and to bargain collectively. Had
the Court not made the same interpretive, analytical, doctrinal, and
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logical mistakes in case after case, workers would be finally freed
from the legacy of discrimination they have endured for far too long
from both the judicial and legislative branches of government. At
a minimum, they would not be vulnerable to rules of tort and
accident compensation which were aimed specifically at them. Had
the Charter been applied in the proper way, workers would get the
same protection and be entitled to the same guarantees as everyone
else.
Whether workers will ever enjoy the kind of protection
which the Charter can provide is something no one can predict with
any confidence today. Although the Court has been clear that the
law of grievance arbitration - the so-called common law of the shop
42
- does fall within the scope of the Charter, the reasoning and
results of all of its other labour cases makes it impossible to be
optimistic that the Court will suddenly change its views and
Even though, in an extra-judicial pronouncement,
approach.
Beverley McLachlin has encouraged members of the judiciary to be
open to the opportunity of admitting and correcting past mistakes,
as a practical matter, the Court as a whole has resisted such
openness and honesty.4 3 On at least four different occasions, the
Court has failed to take advantage of an opportunity to overturn its
decision in Dolphin Delivery, 4 and, in its judgment in P.IP.S., it
missed a chance to correct its mistake in the Labour Trilogy.45
Unless and until the members of the current Court face up to just
how arbitrarily their predecessors have treated workers in the past,
42 Slaight Communications,supra, note 10.
43 Madam Justice McLachlin, "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Perspective" (1989) 23 U.B.C. L Rev. 579.
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44 Supra, note 5. See BCG.E.U., supra, note 35; Slaight Communications,supra, note
10; Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530; and McKlnney, supra, note 7. For comments on
the first three of these cases, see Talking Heads and the Supremes, supra, note 7 at 97 and
D.M. Beatty, "A Conservative's Court: The Politicization of Law" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. 147.
Except for Bertha Wilson's dissenting opinion in Mclinney, none of the judges even addressed
the criticisms that have been levelled at the Court's decision in Dolphin Delivery. Although
Wilson did acknowledge and make reference to many of the critiques of Dolphin Delivery, for
the most part, she avoided the most telling criticisms that have been written about that case.
45 Note also that, in its decision in Workers' Compensation Reference, supra, note 34, the
Court missed an opportunity to correct the very serious interpretative error it made in
Andrews, supra, note 18.
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the latter will be destined to toil in a world which gives no credence
either to the most basic principles of constitutional order and/or to
the rule of law.

